ABA Model Rule 8.4(g): An Exercise in Coercing Virtue? by Park, Jack
Chapman Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 2 Symposium: Honoring the Scholarship of
Ronald D. Rotunda
Article 8
Spring 1-1-2019
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g): An Exercise in Coercing
Virtue?
Jack Park
Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions, chapmanlawreview@chapman.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized editor of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jack Park, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g): An Exercise in Coercing Virtue?, 22 Chap. L. Rev. 267 (2019).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol22/iss2/8
  
 
 
CHAPMAN LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
 
Citation: Jack Park, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g): An Exercise in Coercing Virtue?, 22 
CHAP. L. REV. 267 (2019).  
--For copyright information, please contact chapmanlawreview@chapman.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY | FOWLER SCHOOL OF LAW | ONE UNIVERSITY DRIVE | ORANGE, 
CALIFORNIA 92866 
WWW.CHAPMANLAWREVIEW.COM 
Do Not Delete 5/22/2019 8:29 PM 
 
267 
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g): 
An Exercise in Coercing Virtue? 
Jack Park 
In August 2016, at its annual convention, which was held in San 
Francisco, California the American Bar Association (ABA) approved 
a revision to Rule 8.4(g) of its Model Rules of Professional Conduct.1 
That new rule is not self-executing. Instead, it will have to be 
submitted to the licensing authorities in the states. 
To date, only Vermont has adopted the new rule.2 A number 
of states, including Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas have rejected proposals to 
adopt the rule in their respective states.3 Several other states are 
considering its adoption. So, it’s not off to a roaring start. 
There are good reasons for the remaining states to look 
skeptically at the proposed rule. In this Article, I first introduce the 
ABA and point out why it embarked on this enterprise. Then, I 
explain the wide-ranging scope of the proposed new rule. The new 
rule represents a significant expansion in the scope of potential 
disciplinary authority and exposure. I then point to the First 
Amendment problems it raises. Finally, I explain how it presents 
problems for the disciplinary authorities. 
I. THE ABA AND ITS ROLE 
A. The ABA as Professional Regulator 
At the outset we should keep in mind that the proposed rule 
is the product of the ABA, which represents only a small subset 
of the profession. In August 2018, Roy Strom reported that the 
 
  Mr. Jack Park is a solo practitioner based in Gainesville, GA. He is a participating 
attorney for the Southeastern Legal Foundation and a Visiting Legal Fellow for the 
Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions. Jack has written amicus briefs for a number 
of litigating foundations and continues that work along with other civil litigation. 
 1 See generally Samson Habte, ABA Delegates Overwhelmingly Approve Anti-Bias 
Rule, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.bna.com/aba-delegates-overwhelmingly-
n73014446149/ [http://perma.cc/W46N-XREW]. 
 2 See States split on new ABA Model Rule limiting harassing or discriminatory conduct, 
ABA J., http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ethics_model_rule_harassing_conduct/news/ 
article/does_a_diverse_bench_really_matter/?icn=sidebar&ici=text [http://perma.cc/38AP-RM3D] 
[hereinafter States Split on new ABA Model Rule]. 
 3 See id. 
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ABA had fewer than 200,000 dues-paying members and an estimated 
400,000 total members.4 That’s out of an estimated 1.3 million 
lawyers in the United States.5 To boost membership, the ABA has 
adopted “a simpler and less-expensive schedule of membership fees 
in an effort to revitalize the association’s long-declining membership 
rates.”6 If the plan works, it will have 268,812 paying members in 
2024, instead of the expected 155,766.7 Either way, though, its 
membership will still be far less than a majority of the total number 
of lawyers in the United States. 
That said, the ABA represents an outsized player in the legal 
world. As the late Professor Ron Rotunda observed, the ABA “is 
more than a trade association. It also has some governmental 
power, which makes its latest foray into political correctness of 
more than passing interest.”8 It periodically, as here, considers 
and proposes changes in the ethical constraints on lawyers. In 
addition, the ABA’s influence over federal judicial nominations 
waxes and wanes with changes in administrations.9 
Moreover, the ABA has been given the power to accredit law 
schools. Those law schools must teach the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Responsibility, and their students must pass a 
Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, which incorporates 
those Rules, to be licensed.10 As a result, it is entirely possible 
that Rule 8.4(g) will appear on the test even if it has not been 
adopted by a particular state. 
The proposed rule is an exercise in professional regulation. 
Professor Rotunda explained that, whenever lawyers draft rules 
to govern the practice of law, “[w]hatever advantage we lawyers 
have with intimate knowledge of the subject matter—the practice 
of law—we must counterbalance with the self-interest inherent 
when lawyers draft rules governing their own behavior.”11 
 
 4 Roy Strom, ABA to Slash Dues Amid Membership Drop, AM. LAW. (Aug. 6, 2018, 
4:03 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/08/06/aba-to-slash-dues-amid-membership-
drop/?slreturn=20181012120933 [http://perma.cc/YMQ3-MDAM]. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Ron Rotunda, The ABA Overrules the First Amendment, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2016, 
7:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-aba-overrules-the-first-amendment-1471388418. 
 9 The significance of the ABA’s “well qualified” rating for judicial nominees, which Senate 
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer has called the “gold standard by which judicial candidates are 
judged,” also gets inconsistent treatment. See Ed Whelan, Schumer Smears Judicial Nominee 
Thomas Farr, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 27, 2018, 10:21 AM), www.nationalreview.com/bench-
memos/schumer-smears-judicial-nomineee-thomas-farr [http://perma.cc/7UHT-2Q5F]. 
 10 Ronald D. Rotunda, Legal Memorandum: The ABA Decision to Control What Lawyers 
Say: Supporting “Diversity” but not Diversity of Thought, HERITAGE FOUND., Oct. 6, 2016, at 
A4, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/LM-191.pdf [http://perma.cc/GMU2-2892].  
 11 Ronald D. Rotunda, Applying the Revised ABA Model Rules in the Age of the 
Internet: The Problem of Metadata, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 176 (2013). 
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The ABA’s inherent self-interest is, moreover, more likely to 
favor the interests of large law firms, not solo or small firms.12 
One might think that lawyers who combine an “intimate 
knowledge of the subject matter” with experience in drafting 
documents and rules would avoid ambiguity and speak with 
clarity. That is not the case with Model Rule 8.4(g) and its 
Comments. Two practitioners concluded that the Model Rule “is 
riddled with unanswered questions, including but not limited 
to . . . the meaning of key terms, how it interplays with other 
provisions of the Model Rules, and what disciplinary sanction 
should apply to a violation; as well as due process and First 
Amendment free expression infirmities.”13 For example, to what 
extent does the rule’s coverage of “conduct related to the practice 
of law” reach a bumper sticker on a lawyer’s car driven to and 
from depositions or court hearings, or a Washington Redskins 
t-shirt worn at a bar-sponsored 5K ?14 
B. The ABA’s Reasons for Adopting Model Rule 8.4(g) 
The ABA advanced a variety of reasons for adopting Model 
Rule 8.4(g).15 Some of the mandarins sought to turn lawyers into 
societal leaders and burnish the reputation of lawyers generally. 
Others saw the need for a rule that would deter sexual harassment 
that occurred outside the range of the administration of justice. 
For her part, past ABA President Paulette Brown said that 
lawyers are “responsible for making our society better” and that 
because of lawyers’ “power,” lawyers should be “the standard by 
which all should aspire.”16 In a similar way, representatives from 
the Oregon New Lawyers Division of the ABA’s Young Lawyers 
Division proposed a resolution which pointed to “a need for a 
cultural shift in understanding the inherent integrity of people 
regardless of their race, color, national origin, religion, age, sex, 
gender identity, gender expression, marital status, or disability, to 
be captured in the rules of professional conduct.”17 In short, lawyers 
are supposed to lead, and the ethical rules should make us do it. 
 
 12 See Steven Chung, The ABA Is Losing Money Because It Does Not Provide Value To 
Small Firms, ABOVE L. (May 7, 2018, 9:57 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/03/the-aba-is-
losing-money-because-it-does-not-provide-value-to-small-firms [http://perma.cc/8RP5-H6UA]. 
 13 Andrew F. Halaby & Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of Professional Conduct 
8.4(g): Legislative History, Enforceability Questions, and a Call for Scholarship, 41 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 201, 257 (2017). 
 14 See John J. Park, More on the ABA’s Threat to Free Speech, FEDERALIST SOC’Y 
(June 19, 2017), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/blog-posts/more-on-the-aba-s-threat-to-free-
speech [http://perma.cc/8L5W-7UML]. 
 15 See States split on new ABA Model Rule, supra note 2. 
 16 Rotunda, supra note 8. 
 17 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Memorandum on Draft 
Proposal to Amend Model Rule 8.4 at 2 (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
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At a 2016 hearing, though, “several witnesses expressed their 
concerns about sexual harassment that occurs during the practice 
of law, and in particular at after-hours social functions.”18  
The ABA’s report, justifying the final version of Rule 8.4(g), cited the 
“substantial anecdotal information” provided to the Standing 
Committee of “sexual harassment” at “activities such as firm dinners 
and other nominally social events at which lawyers are present solely 
because of their association with their law firm or in connection with 
the practice of law.”19  
The general effect was to broaden the reach of the new rule from 
conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice” to “conduct 
related to the practice of law.”20 
The Standing Committee summed it up this way, suggesting 
that the need for the new rule “transcends the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.”21 That is true whether “such conduct is or 
is not common in our [legal] profession.”22 It explained, “It is time 
that harassment and discriminatory conduct by a lawyer based 
on race, religion, sex, disability, LGBTQ status or other factors, 
be considered professional misconduct when such conduct is 
related to the practice of law.”23 In sum: 
[T]he public has a right to know that as a largely self-governing 
profession we hold ourselves to normative standards of conduct in all 
our professional activities, in furtherance of the public’s interest in 
respect for the rule of law and for those who interpret and apply the 
law, the legal profession.24 
We are often reminded how remarkable it is that the ABA 
believes itself entitled to speak for all lawyers, especially given 
the relatively small number of lawyers who are actually 
members. Model Rule 8.4(g) is just another iteration of that 
tendency. Its desire to bind them all to its self-improvement 
regime is breathtaking. 
 
dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/rule_8_4_language_choice_memo_12_22_2
015.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/M8NV-MNFZ] [hereinafter Language Choice 
Memo] (emphasis added); see also Rotunda, supra note 10, at A3 (“We must change the 
Model Rules not to protect clients, not to protect the courts and the system of justice, and not 
to protect the role of lawyers as officers of the court. No, the purpose is much more 
grandiose: to create a ‘cultural shift.’”). 
 18 See Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 244 (2017). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 251. 
 21 Language Choice Memo, supra note 17, at 7. 
 22 Id.  
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
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II. PROPOSED NEW MODEL RULE 8.4(G) 
Under amended Model Rule 8.4(g), it would be misconduct for 
a lawyer to engage in conduct that he or she “knows or reasonably 
should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic 
status in conduct related to the practice of law.”25 The covered 
conduct can be either “verbal or physical conduct,” including 
“unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”26 
The text of the proposed rule alone represents a massive 
expansion in the scope of disciplinary authority. Model Rule 
8.4(d) currently provides, “it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to engage in conduct that is ‘prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.’”27 Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4 was 
added in 1998.28 It states that a lawyer who, “in the course of 
representing a client, . . . knowingly manifests, by words or 
conduct, bias or prejudice based on race, sex, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic 
status . . . .” violates the rule when such actions are “prejudicial 
to the administration of justice.”29 
Significantly, the comment did not impose discipline; only the 
rules did. In 2015, the ABA observed that adding the comment “was 
a compromise result reached after six years of proposals and 
counterproposals.”30 It explained, though, “[b]y addressing this 
issue in a comment . . . the compromise did not make 
manifestations of bias or prejudice such as discrimination or 
harassment a separate and direct violation of the Model Rules.”31 
The new rule creates a violation in circumstances in which the 
old rule did not. It starts by adding characteristics to the previous 
list of eight. The new rule’s text expressly covers eleven separate 
characteristics to be protected from demeaning or derogatory 
speech.32 That’s three more than old Comment 3, with the addition 
of ethnicity, gender identity, and marital status.33 The ABA said 
 
 25 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 26 Id. at r. 8.4(g) cmt. 3. 
 27 See Language Choice Memo, supra note 17, at 2. 
 28 See Handel Destinvil, ABA Committee Proposes New Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 17, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/ 
committees/minority-trial-lawyer/practice/2016/aba-committee-proposes-new-model-rule-
professional-conduct/ [http://perma.cc/3UQ6-SYNK]. 
 29 Language Choice Memo, supra note 17, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 30 Id. at 1. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 2. 
 33 See id. at 2–3; see also id. at 5 (“‘Gender identity’ is relevant as a new social awareness 
of the individuality of gender has changed the traditional binary concept of sexuality.”). 
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that the “additional categories reflect current concerns regarding 
discriminatory practices.”34  
New Comment 3 expands the definition of “harassment” to 
include “derogatory or demeaning verbal . . . conduct.”35 That 
means that, as Josh Blackman notes, the rule’s scope is not 
limited to sexual harassment, but reaches derogatory or 
demeaning speech touching on any of the protected classes.36 
That said, “speech that satisfies any of these definitions is 
entirely protected by the First Amendment . . . .”37 
Comment 3 does state, “[t]he substantive law of 
antidiscrimination and anti-harassment statutes and case law may 
guide application of paragraph (g).”38 That part of the Comment is 
not entirely clear. If the substantive law does apply, the speech at 
issue should have to be sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to 
constitute an “abusive working environment” before it can be the 
basis for discipline.39 If it “may” (or “may not”) apply, then what 
happens with a single remark that is perceived to be “harassing? ”   
“Conduct related to the practice of law” also has an 
expansive reach. Comment 4 states, in part:  
Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing 
clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, 
lawyers and others while engaged in the practice of law; operating 
or managing a law firm or law practice; and participating in bar 
association, business or social activities in connection with the 
practice of law.40 
The representation of clients and a lawyer’s interactions with 
witnesses, court personnel, other lawyers, and others fit neatly into 
conduct that might be prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
“Conduct related to the practice of law” reaches far more broadly to 
cover a lawyer’s “bar association, business or social activities.” The 
new rule could be applied to speech at dinners hosted by bar 
associations or similar legal groups, teaching at law schools, and a 
lawyer’s speaking “at career day at his or her child’s Catholic school 
about the role of faith in the practice of law.”41 “The important 
question is not whether a [listener’s] reaction is ‘reasonable,’ but 
 
 34 Id. at 4. 
 35 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 36 Blackman, supra note 18, at 244–46. 
 37 Id. at 245 (emphasis in original). 
 38 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 39 Blackman, supra note 18, at 245 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775, 787–88 (1998)). 
 40 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 41 Blackman, supra note 18, at 247–48. 
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whether a [speaker] should ‘reasonably’ know a [listener] will be 
triggered by disrespectful speech.”42  
Of course, the ABA’s mandarins made sure to protect their 
own. Comment 4 states, in part, “[l]awyers may engage in conduct 
undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion without violating 
this Rule by, for example, implementing initiatives aimed at 
recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees or 
sponsoring diverse law student organizations.”43 Josh Blackman 
notes, “[t]his comment amounts to an unconstitutional form of 
viewpoint discrimination.”44 It “explicitly sanctions one perspective” 
on the divisive issue of affirmative action, while exposing the other 
side to potential discipline.45 
III. PROPOSED MODEL RULE 8.4(G) AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In recent years, offended observers have pursued a variety of 
claims directed at clothing they have found offensive. In 2015, a 
federal judge upheld the revocation of the Washington Redskins’ 
trademark by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board, which concluded that the trademark was 
disparaging to Native Americans.46 In 2016, the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission remanded a claim that the 
wearing of a cap bearing the Gadsden Flag insignia (“Don’t Tread 
on Me”) in a workplace for consideration of whether that made for 
a racially discriminatory work environment.47 
Events like those prompt consideration of whether Model Rule 
8.4(g) would reach the wearing of a Washington Redskins 
championship t-shirt at a bar-sponsored 5K run. What about a 
lawyer with Gadsden Flag license plates, which Virginia will issue, 
or a Gadsden Flag bumper sticker on his or her car? If driven to a 
bar convention or work, would that make the lawyer’s actions 
“conduct related to the practice of law”? 
Certainly, one might think that the First Amendment would 
have a bearing on the propriety of enforcing Model Rule 8.4(g) in 
 
 42 Id. at 248.  
 43 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 8.4(g) cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 44 Blackman, supra note 18, at 259. 
 45 Id. 
 46 In 2018, after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 
(2017), the Fourth Circuit vacated the order to revoke the trademark. See Erik Brady, Appeals 
Court Vacates Decisions that Canceled Redskins Trademark Registrations, USA TODAY (Jan. 
18, 2018, 8:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2018/01/18/appeals-court-vacates-
decisions-canceled-redskins -trademark-registrations/1046758001/ [http://perma.cc/6UUY-78EF]. 
 47 See Eugene Volokh, Wearing ‘Don’t Tread on Me’ insignia could be punishable racial 
harassment, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/08/03/wearing-dont-tread-on-me-insignia-could-be-punishable-racial-
harassment/?utm_term=.10ab86ecdfa6 [http://perma.cc/QUM9-EBKD]. 
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those cases, among others involving speech. But, “[t]he most 
striking aspect of the adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g) is how little 
awareness the ABA expressed about the boundless scope of 
prohibited speech.”48  
An earlier draft of Comment 3 from December 2015 
“stressed that the rule ‘does not apply to conduct unrelated to 
the practice of law or conduct protected by the First 
Amendment.’”49 It also recognized a “private sphere” in which 
“personal opinion . . . religious expression, and political speech” 
would receive First Amendment protection.50 
At the February 2016 hearing, however, a former ABA 
president complained that allowing for First Amendment protection 
of some speech would make it very difficult to enforce the rule 
because such protection would “take away” from its purpose.51 In 
the end, her “position prevailed, and the proviso was removed in the 
second draft.”52 Josh Blackman observes, “[n]either the final rule, 
nor the comments, nor the ratified report, makes any reference to 
the First Amendment. This regrettable omission was deliberate.”53 
Contrary to that record, though, the First Amendment 
protects speech even when it is unpopular, harmful, derogatory, 
or demeaning. “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the 
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable.”54 The First Amendment protects 
offensive, disagreeable, and even hurtful speech.55 
Just last term, in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky,56 the 
Court found a Minnesota law banning the wearing of political 
apparel at the polling place facially unconstitutional. The apparel in 
question was a t-shirt bearing the Tea Party logo and the words 
“Don’t Tread on Me” and a button saying “Please I.D. Me.”57 Even 
though Minnesota had a permissible objective in limiting 
distractions in the polling place, its law swept too broadly and 
indeterminably to be constitutionally applied.58 If Minnesota cannot 
 
 48 Blackman, supra note 18, at 248. 
 49 Id. (citing ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Notice of Public 
Hearing 14 (2015)). 
 50 Id. at 248–49. 
 51 Id. at 249 (quoting former ABA President Laurel Bellows). 
 52 Id. at 250 (emphasis in original). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 55 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents 
of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (E.D. Wis. 1991). 
 56 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891–92 (2018). 
 57 Id. at 1884.  
 58 Id. at 1880, 1888.  
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regulate political speech in polling places, the ABA should not be 
able to regulate it in activities related to the practice of law. 
More generally, Josh Blackman and others have pointed to 
the Court’s decision in National Institute of Family and Life 
Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA),59 as authority for concluding that 
Model Rule 8.4(g) is unconstitutional.60 In comments submitted 
to the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
Professor Blackman argued that, even as modified by 
Pennsylvania, Model Rule 8.4(g) “raise[d] constitutional 
concerns” that were “highlighted” by NIFLA.61 In its comment 
letter of July 17, 2018, urging the Disciplinary Board of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania not to adopt that modified 
version of Model Rule 8.4(g), the Christian Legal Society pointed 
to both NIFLA and Matal v. Tam.62 
In NIFLA, the Court held that challengers who contended 
that a California law requiring licensed and unlicensed 
pregnancy-related clinics to make specified disclosures violated 
the First Amendment were likely to prevail on their challenges.63 
It reversed the Ninth Circuit decision affirming the denial of 
injunctive relief.64 The law required the licensed clinics to display 
messages concerning the availability of public funding for 
abortions, a practice that those clinics opposed.65  
The Court determined that the California law was a 
content-based regulation of speech because it “compel[led] 
individuals to speak a particular message . . . ‘alter[ing] the content 
of their speech.’”66 It rejected the contention that the clinics’ speech 
was entitled to less than strict scrutiny because professional speech 
was involved.67 While professional speech and conduct may be 
regulated in some circumstances, neither of those circumstances 
was present.68 First, to the extent that “more deferential review” 
 
 59 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 60 See, e.g., Letter from Josh Blackman, Assoc. Professor, S. Tex. Coll. of Law Hous., to 
Office of the Sec’y, The Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa. (July 13, 2018), 
https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/sites/default/files/site_files/Letter-Pennsylvania-
Blackman.pdf [http://perma.cc/E6RP-MGU3]. 
 61 See id.  
 62 See Letter from David Nammo, CEO & Exec. Dir. Christian Legal Soc’y, to 
Office of the Sec’y, The Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa. (July 17, 2018),  
https://www.christianlegalsociety.org/sites/default/files/site_files/Christian%20Legal%20S
ociety%20PA%20Comment%20Letter%20Submitted.pdf [http://perma.cc/WA9S-TGQU]. 
 63 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2378.  
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 2368. 
 66 Id. at 2371 (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 
795 (1988)). 
 67 Id. at 2371–72. 
 68 Id. at 2372.  
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may be applied “to some laws that require professionals to disclose 
factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial 
speech,’” the required notices did not relate to the services the 
clinics provided, but to “state-sponsored services—including 
abortion . . . .”69 Second, to the extent professional conduct 
incidentally burdens speech can be regulated, the law regulated 
“speech as speech.”70  
Accordingly, the California law was subjected to strict 
scrutiny as a content-based regulation of speech.71 The Court 
noted that, as for the regulation of licensed clinics and the 
desire to educate low-income women, the required notice was 
“wildly underinclusive.”72 As for the unlicensed clinics, any 
justification offered by California was nothing more than 
“purely hypothetical.”73 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Gorsuch, saw “viewpoint 
discrimination [as] inherent in the design and structure” of the 
California law.74 Justice Kennedy characterized the law as “a 
paradigmatic example of the serious threat presented when 
government seeks to impose its own message in the place of 
individual speech, thought, and expression.”75 
NIFLA’s treatment of professional speech is particularly 
important. As the Court notes, “[p]rofessionals might have a host of 
good-faith disagreements, both with each other and with the 
government, on many topics in their respective fields.”76 For example, 
in a way that touches on the hot rail of marital status, “lawyers and 
marriage counselors might disagree about the prudence of prenuptial 
agreements or the wisdom of divorce . . . .”77 Restricting the range of 
lawyer speech denies access to the test of the market, which the 
Court sees as “[t]he best test of truth.”78 
Matal v. Tam may well have put another nail in the coffin 
bearing this line of attack.79 In Matal, the Court resoundingly 
 
 69 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 70 Id. at 2372, 2374. 
 71 Id. at 2366. 
 72 Id. at 2375. 
 73 Id. at 2377. 
 74 Id. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 75 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 76 Id. at 2374–75. 
 77 Id. at 2375. Or, as Josh Blackman proposes, “A speaker remarks over dinner that 
unmarried attorneys are better candidates for law firms because they will be able to 
dedicate more time to the practice.” Blackman, supra note 18, at 246. Put simply, there is 
a myriad of ways to run afoul of Model Rule 8.4(g). 
 78 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 
630 (1919)). 
 79 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). 
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concluded that 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), which prohibits the “registration 
of trademarks that may ‘disparage . . . or . . . bring into contemp[t] or 
disrepute’ any ‘persons, living or dead.’ . . . violates the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment.”80 The U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office relied on that statute in denying a trademark application for 
an Asian-American band named the “Slants” because of the offensive 
nature of the band’s name.81  
Announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Alito wrote, the 
statute “offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may 
not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”82 
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Breyer, 
Justice Alito rejected the contention that the ban was narrowly 
tailored, noting that it also reached trademarks like “Down with 
racists,” for example.83 Viewed in that light, the disparagement 
clause could not be “an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happy-talk 
clause. In this way, it goes much further than is necessary to serve 
the interest asserted.”84 Accordingly, Justice Alito concluded that the 
disparagement clause was unconstitutional.85 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.86 Justice 
Kennedy wrote separately to “explain[ ] in greater detail why the 
First Amendment’s protections against viewpoint discrimination 
apply to the trademark here.”87 In that regard, “[t]he test for 
viewpoint discrimination is whether—within the relevant subject 
category—the government has singled out a subset of messages for 
disfavor based on the views expressed.”88  
In that regard, “[t]he Government may not insulate a law from 
charges of viewpoint discrimination by tying censorship to the 
reaction of the speaker’s audience.”89 Justice Kennedy explained, 
“[t]he danger of viewpoint discrimination is that the government is 
attempting to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a broader 
debate. The danger is all the greater if the ideas or perspectives are 
ones a particular audience might think offensive . . . .”90 Put simply, 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 1765. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 88 Id. at 1766. 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id. at 1767. 
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“a speech burden based on audience reactions is simply government 
hostility and intervention in a different guise.”91 
That is precisely what Model Rule 8.4(g) contemplates: 
Measuring the propriety of speech by the reaction of individuals 
listening to or observing it. Someone offended by a discussion of 
“mismatch” theory that includes a suggestion that affirmative 
action in higher education should be banned because it can hurt 
minority students by placing them in an educational setting 
where their chances of success are lower than they might be at 
a different institution, can complain that the speaker said 
something demeaning on the basis of race.92 Model Rule 8.4(g) is 
a recipe for viewpoint discrimination. 
Finally, the wide reach of Model Rule 8.4(g), both as to its 
live-wire subject areas and as to the range of activities covered, will 
inevitably chill both speech and association. For example, Professor 
Rotunda points to the St. Thomas More Society, “an organization of 
‘Catholic lawyers and judges’ who strengthen their ‘faith through 
education, fellowship and prayer.’”93 Any St. Thomas More Society 
event, like the Annual Red Mass or a Continuing Legal Education 
(CLE) program, would fit within the definition of “conduct related to 
the practice of law.” Discussion of issues like gay marriage that does 
not include both sides may lead a state bar to conclude that Society 
membership violates Model Rule 8.4(g) because it opposes gay 
marriage and is not “inclusive.”94  
Professor Rotunda notes that, if a state bar opined that 
membership in the St. Thomas More Society could violate Model 
Rule 8.4(g), “many lawyers may decide that it is better to be safe 
than sorry, better to leave the St. Thomas More Society than to 
ignore the ethics opinion and risk a battle.”95 Professor Rotunda 
also saw the potential for viewpoint discrimination: If a lawyer 
belongs to an organization that opposes gay marriage, he or she 
“can face problems,” but belonging to an organization that favors 
gay marriage brings the lawyer “home free.”96 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 See Blackman, supra note 18, at 246. 
 93 Rotunda, supra note 10, at 4 (citing ST. THOMAS MORE SOC’Y OF ORANGE COUNTY, 
http://www.stthomasmore.net [http://perma.cc/M7FK-VU2T]).  
 94 Id. at 5. 
 95 Id.  
 96 Id. 
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IV. PROPOSED MODEL RULE 8.4(G) AND THE REGULATORS 
A. The Regulatory Difficulty 
Vesting discretion in the hands of bar regulators and trusting 
to their judgment is no solution. Regulators in some state bars have 
day jobs, so it makes little sense to load more on them. If adopted, 
Model Rule 8.4(g) would do precisely that because of its broad 
reach. Moreover, regulatory bodies are capable of disappointing 
the trust placed in them. 
But, trusting the discretion of regulators is precisely what the 
ABA wants us to do. At the Federalist Society’s 2016 National 
Lawyers Convention, Professor Deborah Rhode defended Model 
Rule 8.4(g) in a debate with Professor Eugene Volokh.97 She 
asserted that, because local disciplinary bodies “don’t have enough 
resources to go after people who steal from their clients’ trust fund 
accounts,” there is little likelihood of their vigorously enforcing 
limitations on speech.98 She acknowledged that anyone offended 
by a remark made in connection with the practice of law might 
make a complaint, but suggested that such complaints would go 
nowhere because “we as a profession, I think, have the capacity to 
deal with occasional abuses.”99 
The problem is more complex than Professor Rhode gives it 
credit. The bar disciplinary bodies have no principled way of 
dismissing a complaint that arises from a statement that addresses 
one of the eleven live-wire categories in a way that offends someone. 
They will have to call for a response from the speaker. 
On December 17, 2017, the Disciplinary Board of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania echoed one of Professor Rhode’s 
observations: It noted that the “breadth” of the proposed rule “will 
pose difficulties for already resource-strapped disciplinary 
authorities.”100 It noted, “the rule subjects to discipline not only a 
lawyer who knowingly engages in harassment or discrimination, 
but also a lawyer who negligently utters a derogatory or demeaning 
comment.”101 Even if no discipline is imposed, the process will be 
the punishment. 
 
 97 Federalist Soc’y, Ninth Annual Rosenkranz Debate: Hostile Environment Law 
and the First Amendment, YOUTUBE (Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
MYsNkMw32Eg&t=5s [http://perma.cc/7Y32-HPG7]. 
 98 Id.  
 99 Id.; see also id. (“I don’t think we’d see a lot of toleration for those aberrant complaints.”). 
 100 Proposed Amendments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct Relating to 
Misconduct, 46 PA. BULLETIN 7519 (Dec. 3, 2016), http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/ 
vol46/46-49/2062.html [http://perma.cc/X2ZC-79PH]. 
 101 Id. 
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Professor Rotunda illustrated the problem for bar regulatory 
authorities with a hypothetical: 
If one lawyer tells another, at the water cooler or a bar association 
meeting on tax reform, “I abhor the idle rich. We should raise capital 
gains taxes,” he has just violated the ABA rule by manifesting bias 
based on socioeconomic status.  
If the other lawyer responds, “You’re just saying that because you’re a 
short, fat, hillbilly, neo-Nazi,” he’s in the clear, because those epithets 
are not in the sacred litany. Of course, that cannot be what the ABA 
means, because it is always in good taste to attack the rich. Yet, that 
is what the rule says.102 
Conversely, a lawyer at the firm coffee pot might tell another, 
“low income individuals who receive public assistance should be 
subjected to mandatory drug testing.” As Josh Blackman explains, 
that statement, which might be seen by an observer as unfairly 
provocative, could result in discipline because the speaker 
“‘reasonably should know’ that someone at the event could find the 
remarks disparaging” toward those of lower socioeconomic status.103 
When, as noted above, the bar disciplinary authorities call for 
an explanation, the lawyer enters into an administrative process 
that lacks some of the constitutional protection one gets in court. 
The disciplinary boards “do[ ] not typically open [their] proceedings 
to the public, [they] follow[ ] relaxed rules of evidence, and there is 
no jury.”104 As with the St. Thomas More Society and its 
membership, lawyers will prefer to hold their tongues and have 
their speech chilled than visit with the bar disciplinary authorities. 
B. An Invitation to Viewpoint Discrimination 
Both scenarios present bar regulatory authorities with a 
claim that presents a violation on its face. There is no principled 
way of dismissing those claims even though the comments are 
plainly protected by the First Amendment. They will have to ask for 
a response. That response will require the regulators to make finely 
honed discretionary judgments. That said, vesting disciplinary 
authorities with discretion is an invitation to engage in viewpoint 
discrimination. Two recent examples of the consideration shown by 
regulatory bodies, however, show both hostility to conservative 
messaging and the absence of viewpoint neutrality. 
First, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of 
Jack Phillips displayed blatant hostility toward his views, as the 
Court found in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil 
 
 102 Rotunda, supra note 10, at 4. 
 103 Blackman, supra note 18, at 246. 
 104 Rotunda, supra note 10, at 6. 
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Rights Comm’n.105 As the Supreme Court noted, Jack Phillips was 
entitled to “neutral and respectful consideration of his claims in all 
the circumstances of the case,” but he didn’t get it from the 
Commission.106 One commissioner asserted, “[f]reedom of religion 
and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination 
throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the 
holocaust . . . .”107 The Court noted that such a comparison was 
“inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn 
responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s 
antidiscrimination law—a law that protects against discrimination 
on the basis of religion as well as sexual orientation.”108 
The same commissioner also described Jack Phillips’ invocation 
of his religious beliefs as “one of the most despicable pieces of 
rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt 
others.”109 The Court explained, “[t]o describe a man’s faith as 
‘one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can 
use’ is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct ways: by 
describing it as despicable, and also by characterizing it as 
merely rhetorical—something insubstantial and even insincere.”110 
In addition, the Commission and the Colorado Court of 
Appeals treated Jack Phillips differently from other bakers who 
refused to prepare a cake bearing a message that disapproved of 
same-sex marriage.111 Three other bakers were found to have 
acted within their rights by declining to create those cakes.112 
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that the other bakeries 
did not discriminate because their action was based on “the 
offensive nature of the requested message.”113 
The Court found the distinction lacking. As it observed, a 
“principled rationale for the difference in treatment . . . cannot be 
based on the government’s own assessment of offensiveness.”114 
The Court concluded, “[t]he Colorado court’s attempt to account 
for the difference in treatment elevates one view of what is 
 
 105 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1729 (2018). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id.  
 108 Id. 
 109 Id.  
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 1720. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 1731 (quoting Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc, 370 P.3d 272, 282 n.8 
(Colo. App. 2015)). 
 114 Id. 
Do Not Delete 5/22/2019 8:29 PM 
282 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:2 
offensive over another and itself sends a signal of official 
disapproval of Jack Phillips’ religious beliefs.”115  
Put simply, although the Court did not put it this way, the 
Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals were engaged in 
viewpoint discrimination. They were punishing a message they 
did not agree with and giving a contrary message, with which 
they did agree, a free pass. 
Second, the Ohio Elections Commission found itself in the 
position of judging the truth of political advertisements regarding 
the Affordable Care Act statute. The Susan B. Anthony List (SBA 
List) criticized Steve Driehaus (D-OH), asserting that, by voting 
for the Act, he voted for a bill that included taxpayer-funded 
abortion.116 Driehaus disagreed, arguing that because the Act calls 
for insurers to collect a separate payment, segregate those funds, 
and use only those segregated funds to pay for abortions, the Act 
doesn’t fund abortions.117 SBA List viewed the segregation rule as 
an accounting gimmick given the fungibility of money. Both 
parties essentially pointed to the same statutory provisions and 
drew contrary inferences from them. 
Driehaus complained that the SBA List violated an Ohio law 
that makes it a criminal offense to make a knowingly or 
recklessly “false” statement about a candidate for office or a 
ballot initiative.118 By a 2-1 vote on partisan lines, the Ohio 
Elections Commission found probable cause to proceed.119  
The Court unanimously held that SBA List did not have to wait 
for the conclusion of proceedings before the Ohio Elections 
Commission to challenge the constitutionality of the Ohio law.120 On 
remand, the District Court found the Ohio law unconstitutional and 
permanently enjoined its enforcement.121 It observed, “the answer 
to false statements in politics is not to force silence, but to 
encourage truthful speech in response, and to let the voters, not the 
Government, decide what the political truth is.”122 
In short, neither the Colorado Human Rights Commission 
nor the Ohio Elections Commission proved able to stay away 
 
 115 Id. 
 116 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 154 (2014). 
 117 See George F. Will, George Will: Campaign speech case is regulatory overkill , 
WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-
campaign-speech-case-is-regulatory-overkill/2014/04/18/39413958-c652-11e3-bf7a-
be01a9b69cf1_story.html?utm_term=.ac7d08a0551d [http://perma.cc/GT3S-MAVJ]. 
 118 Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 153. 
 119 Id. at 154. 
 120 Id. at 151–52.  
 121 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d 765, 770 
(S.D. Ohio 2014). 
 122 Id. 
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from indulging their approval of one side and distaste for the 
other. Model Rule 8.4(g) presents bar disciplinary authorities 
with the opportunity to do precisely the same thing, and our hope 
must be that they will be otherwise too busy to do so. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Model Rule 8.4(g) has been rejected in eight of the nine 
states that have acted on a motion to adopt it.123 Those rejections 
rest on sound legal and prudential grounds that should be 
persuasive to any other state considering its adoption. 
As noted above, the ABA’s membership is one-third or less 
than the total number of lawyers in the United States. If the ABA 
believes that Model Rule 8.4(g) is such a good idea, it should apply 
it to its members as a test before inflicting it on the rest of us.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123 See Scott Flaherty, More States Reject ABA Anti-Bias Ethics Rule, AM. LAWYER 
(Sep. 25, 2018, 3:24 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/09/25/more-states-
reject-aba-anti-bias-ethics-rule/?slreturn=20190220220613 [http://perma.cc/QE79-MNXJ]. 
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